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Introduction
By the end of  2015, all Gulf  Cooperation Council (GCC) states were under financial 
pressures from declining revenues due to falling oil prices. This spurred all of  the states to 
introduce so-called economic reforms during 2016, including increasing prices for basic 
goods such as water, electricity and petrol, and even slashing public pay.1 The spotlight has 
thus increasingly been shone on the Gulf  states’ fiscal positions and budgets.
This paper focuses on one aspect of  the GCC’s budgets that has been neglected for the 
past few decades: their (lack of) transparency, independence and accountability. Partic-
ularly, it focuses on the historical evolution of  the declaration of  oil revenues and their 
expenditure in each of  the GCC countries. Specific focus is placed on that part of  oil 
revenues that does not appear in the public budgets, and especially on those parts that are 
treated as ‘undisclosed allocations’.
The following conclusions will be drawn: 
1.  As of  2017, only Kuwait has a transparent, accountable and independently audited 
state budget, particularly in terms of  oil revenues and their allocations. The rest of 
the GCC countries do not have an independently audited and accountable budget, 
with the spectrum ranging from no kind of  public auditing at all to some form of 
public but not independently audited budgets. 
2.  This was not historically the case, as there were cases of  independently audited 
budgets with much stronger elements of  transparency. 
3.  With the exception of  Kuwait, there is strong evidence to suggest that there are 
significant amounts of  undeclared oil revenues, which go either into private hands 
or into secretive government transactions. 
4.  Finally, the paper will reach a tentative conclusion that with increased moves by the 
states towards austerity and economic reform, this could be an opportune moment 
for the rest of  the citizenry to demand in return greater transparency, indepen-
dence and accountability in relation to oil revenues and state budgets.
The structure of  the paper is as follows: an overview of  the situation of  budgetary trans-
parency, independence and accountability in the GCC countries as they stood at the end 
of  2016 is presented in the next section. The third section focuses on the main budget areas 
where transparency is lacking: foreign transfers, military expenditure and royal alloca-
tions. For comparison purposes, the fourth section examines the history of  budget-setting 
in the Gulf, focusing particularly on documents from the British National Archives. 
The contents of  this paper should be treated as work in progress. As such, the author welcomes any 
feedback and suggestions for future improvements, including on any possible errors or omissions.
1 ‘Saudi Arabia Slashes Ministers’ Pay, Cuts Public Sector Bonuses’, CNBC, 27 September 2016. 
Available at www.cnbc.com/2016/09/27/saudi-arabia-slashes-ministers-pay-cuts-public-sector-bo-
nuses.html (accessed 20 December 2016).
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The discussion serves as a useful contrast between the present situation and the past, 
while also providing uniquely rich detail on the construction and expenditure of  budgets 
in the GCC states across time. The fifth section attempts to demonstrate numerically 
that there is indeed a gap between actual and publicly declared state revenues, although 
it is hard to quantify the exact magnitude of  the gap. The final section concludes with 
some recommendations. 
Budgetary Transparency, Independence and Accountability
As of  2015, Kuwait was the only GCC country with (relatively) publicly and independently 
audited, transparent final accounts of  its budget. The state’s revenues and expenditures 
are audited by the State Audit Bureau, an independent audit entity that is answerable to 
the country’s elected parliament.2 The independent auditing of  the budget is enshrined in 
Article 151 of  the country’s constitution, which states:
The Law shall set up an Audit Bureau and shall guarantee its autonomy. The 
Bureau shall be an adjunct of  the National Assembly, shall assist the Government 
and the National Assembly in controlling and supervising the collection of  the 
State’s revenues and the incurrence of  its expenditure within the limits of  the 
Budget, and shall submit to both, the Government and the National Assembly, an 
Annual Report on its activities accompanied by its observations.3
Of  course, this does not mean that corruption does not exist in Kuwait. Indeed, government 
bureaucracy is nowadays notorious across the Gulf  for endemic ‘middle-range corruption’, 
where cronyism and backdoor dealings are considered to be a significant feature within 
the different levels, institutions and bodies of  the government. Furthermore, classifications 
of  spending still tend to be antiquated and opaque. Thus, the situation is far from ideal. 
It does mean, however, that ‘top-level’ corruption and uses of  the budget revenues and 
expenditure are formally placed under the supervision of  an independent auditor. 
In this respect, Kuwait is unique within the GCC countries, as no other state has a bureau 
with similar independence and levels of  transparency. Furthermore, Kuwait is unique in 
that it has enshrined in law a specific and clear allocation to the ‘emir’. This was increased 
in 2006 from 8 million to 50 million Kuwaiti dinars ($165 million), when the new ruler 
came to power.4 
2 See Kuwait State Audit Bureau’s website. Available at http://www.sabq8.org/sabweb/home.aspx 
(accessed 20 December 2016). 
3 ‘Kuwait’s Constitution of  1962, Reinstated in 1992’, Comparative Constitutions Project, 18 April 2016. 
Available at www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Kuwait_1992.pdf  (accessed 20 December 2016).
4 ‘The Kuwait Emir Spends 50 Million Dinars a Year’ [Amir Al-Kuwait yunfiq 50 million 
dinar sanaweyyan], Al Arabiya, 23 November 2006. Available at http://www.alarabiya.net/arti-
cles/2006/11/23/29322.html (accessed 20 December 2016).
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The situation is different in the other GCC countries. To be clear, all GCC 
countries have state audit organisations that are set up along modern bureau-
cratic lines. The crux of  the matter, however, is the degree of  independence, 
transparency and accountability that these audit organisations offer to the public. None 
reach the level offered by Kuwait’s bureau, although there is variation between the dif-
ferent GCC countries. In Bahrain, the National Audit Court is entrusted by Decree 16 
of  the year 2002 with overseeing the final accounts of  the government’s ministries.5 
This bureau releases the final accounts and an annual report to the public that covers 
the financial and administrative activities and perceived irregularities of  the various gov-
ernmental ministries, releasing its tenth edition in 2015 to cover the fiscal year 2014/15. 
At the time of  writing, the general perception was that in the jurisdiction it covers, the 
report does a professional and detailed job. Indeed, the contents of  the report and the 
alleged financial transgressions it details have become a periodic topic of  interest for the 
general public.6 
However, this bureau is legally and structurally under the royal court, an unelected body 
that is answerable only to the king. Furthermore, the publicly available final accounts and 
audit report does not cover all state expenditure, and there are questions on whether it 
covers all of  the oil revenues (more on which later). For one example, the royal court’s 
revenues and expenditure do not appear in the report. Indeed, when a noted opposition 
figure raised this issue in a notorious interview on state TV, the Minister of  Information 
was fired and the show was cancelled.7 Furthermore, the budgets of  many of  the non-min-
isterial state bodies, including the Economic Development Board and Mumtalakat, the 
state sovereign fund, are not included within it. Arms imports expenditure figures also do 
not appear in the report and the audited budget.
The situation is similar in Oman where the State Audit Institution is entrusted with over-
seeing the financial and managerial auditing of  the state’s ministries. Promulgated by 
Royal Decree No. 55/2000, and revamped by Royal Decree No. 27/2011 following the 
2011 protests, the body releases final accounts to the cabinet, the elected Shura Council 
and the sultan regarding the uses and misuses of  the budget. This report, however, is 
secret and not released to the general public. Furthermore, the jurisdictions of  the report 
and the institution do not cover the budget of  the sultan’s court or the military sector. 
Each of  these has its own accounts and auditing bodies, which are not revealed or answer-
able to the public or the elected Shura Council.
5 ‘Financial Control Bureau Law’ [Qanoon Diwan al Raqaba al Maliyya], Bahrain Ministry of  Justice, 
3 July 2002. Available at http://www.moj.gov.bh/defaultc91e.html?action=article&ID=1471 (accessed 
20 December 2016).
6 ‘Financial Control Bureau Appendix’ [Mulhaq Diwan al Raqaba al Maliyya], Al Wasat News,  Avail-
able at http://www.alwasatnews.com/supplements/RQP (accessed 20 December 2016).
7 Bahrain TV Interview with Ebrahim Sharif, 12 November 2008. Available at https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=ZJR6wC73aO4 (accessed 20 December 2016).
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In the rest of  the countries, the auditing of  state revenues is even more opaque. As men-
tioned previously, all countries of  the GCC have state audit institutions, an obvious 
requisite of  a modern functioning bureaucracy. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has 
the State Audit Institution,8 Qatar the State Audit Bureau, and Saudi Arabia the General 
Auditing Bureau. All of  these prepare detailed budgets and closing accounts for the state 
and its various institutions and ministries. None, however, are answerable to elected bodies, 
and none release public reports on the auditing of  the budgets. In the latter two countries, 
there is no elected legislative body. The UAE does have an elected body at the federal 
level, but it only has advisory powers, while it lacks such institutions at the emirates’ level, 
where the vast majority of  the budget’s expenditure resides. The closing accounts for each 
year’s budget released to the public in Saudi Arabia barely has three lines for each of  the 
sections of  general revenues or general expenditure. In Qatar, the detailed budgets and 
closing accounts are not even shown to the appointed Shura council, and the situation is 
similar in Saudi Arabia. In both countries, this is considered to be purely under the juris-
diction of  the ministerial council. As is the case in Bahrain and Oman, in all five countries 
no details are given on royal allocations, military imports and allocations for non-ministe-
rial governmental organisations. 
Indeed, there is reason to believe that state budgets in the GCC countries are the least 
transparent in the world. The Open Budget Initiative provides an index that compara-
tively measures central budget transparency for countries globally. As of  2015, the only 
two countries from the GCC included in the initiative were Qatar and Saudi Arabia. 
In 2015, the two countries ranked at the absolute bottom of  the index, under the category 
of  ‘scant or none’, behind countries such as Iraq, Myanmar, Lebanon, Equatorial Guinea, 
Venezuela and Sudan.9 The initiative evaluated countries on three criteria: transparency, 
public participation and budgetary oversight. Both Qatar and Saudi Arabia scored 0 out 
of  100 on all three criteria in 2015.10
In summary, the allocation of  state revenues and expenditures in the GCC countries, with 
the partial exception of  Kuwait, is vague, shrouded in secrecy, and prepared and audited 
by bodies that are not answerable to the public. This indicates that there might be signifi-
cant portions of  revenues and expenditures that are undeclared and do not appear within 
whatever meagre data there is regarding total public revenues and expenditure. 
8 See State Audit Institution’s website. Available at http://saiuae.gov.ae/en/pages/home.aspx 
(accessed 20 December 2016).
9 ‘The Open Budget Index 2015’, International Budget Partnership. Available at www.internationalbudget.
org/wp-content/uploads/OBS2015-OBI-Rankings-English.pdf  (accessed 20 December 2016).
10 For Qatar and Saudi respectively: ‘Qatar’, International Budget Partnership, 8 September 2015. Avail-
able at www.internationalbudget.org/summaries/qatar-2 (accessed 20 December 2016); ‘Saudi Arabia’, 
International Budget Partnership, 8 September 2015. Available at www.internationalbudget.org/summa-
ries/saudi-arabia-4 (accessed 20 December 2016).
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Foreign Transfers, Military Imports and Royal Allocations
From publicly available information, what can be said with confidence regarding 
the gaps between declared budgetary revenues and expenditures versus actual ones? 
To paraphrase the infamous words of  former US Secretary of  Defense Donald Rumsfeld, 
there are known knowns, known unknowns and unknown unknowns. The fact that there 
are undeclared budgetary revenues and expenditures in the GCC falls under the known 
unknowns. In other words, we can put forward the proposition that not all revenues and 
expenditures are declared, but it is unknown what is the actual size of  those not declared. 
To begin with the first point, it is actually relatively straightforward to demonstrate that 
certain oil revenues and expenditures are not declared. This can be done through looking 
at three areas which are known to contain the largest parts of  off-budgetary transac-
tions: transfers to foreign states/agents, deals on arms imports and royal court/family 
expenditures and allocations. Although such evidence is anecdotal and by no means com-
prehensive, it does at least point to the fact that there are significant expenditures that do 
not appear in the budget.
Let us begin with the opaquest of  these: transfers to foreign states and agents. It is well 
known that GCC countries execute significant monetary transfers to states and agents 
beyond their borders. Such transfers have a long history, and many reasons have been 
put forward for them, including ‘chequebook diplomacy’ and charitable aid. The publicly 
funded Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) is one of  the oldest 
development funds in the world, and since its inception in 1961 it has extended more than 
$16.7 billion to 102 countries worldwide.11 The wealthier countries of  the GCC (Saudi, 
UAE and Qatar) have similar aid agencies which have distributed significant amounts of 
funds worldwide.
Less transparent are direct transfers to states and institutions on an overtly political basis. 
There is a long history of  such transfers, stretching back to the first arrival of  oil revenues. For 
example, Saudi Arabia allocated approximately 10 percent of  its annual oil to payments to 
Egypt and Jordan in the wake of  the Khartoum Agreement after the 1967 defeat by Israel.12 
Very little information is available regarding the nature, scope and size of  such foreign 
‘chequebook diplomacy’ transfers nowadays, although there are scattered leads. 
For example, there were revelations in 2015 that the Saudi royal family had ‘gifted’ the 
Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak $681 million. It is also often stated that since 
General Abdul-Fattah Al-Sisi took over the rule of  Egypt in 2014, the UAE and Saudi 
Arabia have pumped ‘tens of  billions of  dollars’ into Egypt to steady its faltering econ-
omy.13 Prior to that, Qatar reportedly supported Sisi’s deposed predecessor Mohamed 
11 Bader Al-Mutairi, ‘Kuwait Official Development Assistance: Fifty Years On’, unpublished paper, 2013.
12 British National Archives: FCO 8/1743 Saudi Budget. Letter from the Embassy.
13 Ahmed Feteha, Tarek El-Tablawy and Zainab Fattah, ‘Egypt Readies for Tough Reforms as Gulf 
Seen Tightening Aid’, Bloomberg, 23 August 2016. Available at www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-
08-23/u-a-e-deposits-1-billion-in-egypt-to-shore-up-imf-loan-deal (accessed 20 December 2016).
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Morsi with $7.5 billion during his short rule.14 Qatar has also been rumoured to have 
financially supported groups in the conflicts in Syria and Libya, while the UAE too has 
reportedly provided significant financial backing to parties in the conflict in Libya.15 
By their very nature, these different ‘chequebook diplomacy’ foreign transfers are shrouded 
in secrecy, since both givers and recipients generally do not provide public details regard-
ing such transfers, and they do not appear in publicly declared state budgets. 
The second large category susceptible to off-budgetary expenditures is the military sector, 
including deals on arms importation. Scattered information can be obtained on such 
deals, primarily because arms producers in Western countries often have to declare them, 
although the figures still remain unreliable. According to the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the main authority on arms trade data, Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE were the second and fourth-largest arms importers globally in the years 
2010–14, accounting for 5 percent and 4 percent respectively of  total arms imports 
worldwide.16 In SIPRI’s extremely conservative estimates for the value of  arms imports in 
those years, based on 1990 constant prices, the UAE imported arms worth $15.1 billion, 
Saudi Arabia $11.1 billion, Oman $2.3 billion, Qatar $1.0 billion, Kuwait $1.5 billion 
and Bahrain $786 million.17 These figures seem to have increased significantly in the past 
few years. According to the business magazine Forbes’ own data, ‘between 2013 and 2014, 
Saudi arms imports alone are reported to have increased 54 percent to $6.46 billion. 
In 2014, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates imported $8.6 billion of  military 
equipment.’18
14 ‘Egypt Returns $2 Billion to Qatar in Sign of  Growing Tensions’, VOA News, 19 September 2013. 
Available at www.voanews.com/a/egypt-returns-two-billion-dollars-to-qatar-tension/1753280.html 
(accessed 20 December 2016).
15 Omar AlShehabi, Mahmood AlMahmood and Mohammed AlDousari (eds), The Gulf  after the 
Arab Spring [AlKhaleej Baada al Intifadat al Arabiyya] (Kuwait: Gulf  Centre for Development 
Policies and Dar Afaq, 2016). Available at https://www.gulfpolicies.com/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=2309:-2016-&catid=258:2016-05-16-09-50-52&Itemid=577 (accessed 20 
December 2016).
16 Pieter D. Wezeman and Siemon T. Wezeman, ‘Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2014’, 
SIPRI, March 2015, p. 4. Available at http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1503.pdf  (accessed 20 
December 2016).
17 ‘Top List TIV Tables’, SIPRI, 2017. Available at http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/
toplist.php (accessed 20 December 2016). These, it should be remembered, are severe underestimates 
based on 1990 constant prices, and as SIPRI points out, these ‘figures do not represent sales prices for 
arms transfers. They should therefore not be directly compared with gross domestic product (GDP), 
military expenditure, sales values or the financial value of  export licences in an attempt to measure the 
economic burden of  arms imports or the economic benefits of  exports’; ‘SIPRI Arms Transfers Data-
base: Methodology’, SIPRI, 2017. Available at www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/background 
(accessed 20 December 2016).
18 Niall McCarthy, ‘Saudi Arabia Has Become the World’s Biggest Arms Importer’, Forbes, 10 
March 2015. Available at www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2015/03/10/saudi-arabia-has-be-
come-the-worlds-biggest-arms-importer-infographic/#2715e4857a0b6cafb0d24d45 (accessed 20 
December 2016).
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Such high expenditure does not come as a surprise, particularly given that military expendi-
ture in the GCC is considered to be among the highest in the world. The countries top the 
lists of  military expenditure both per capita and as a percentage of  GDP (Figures 1 and 2).19 
Figure 1. Defence Expenditure Per Capita (in USD), 2010 
Source: ‘The Military Balance 2012’, International Institute for Strategic Studies.
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Figure 2. Defence Expenditure as Percentage of GDP, 2010
Sources: ‘Military Balance 2012’, International Institute for Strategic Studies; ‘SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2017’, SIPRI.
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19 All data in the graphs has been previously published (in Arabic): Omar AlShehabi (ed.), AlKhaleej 
Bayna AlThabet wal Mutahawwel [The Gulf  between Stability and Change] (Beirut and Kuwait: Gulf 
Centre for Development Policies and Muntada Al-Ma’aref, 2014). Available at www.gulfpolicies.com/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1414&Itemid=421 (accessed 20 December 2016).
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As a comparative example, the military expenditure by the GCC countries is reported to 
have exceeded that of  the UK and Israel combined (Figure 3).
Figure 3. Total Defence Expenditure (in million USD), 2010
Sources: ‘Military Balance 2012’, International Institute for Strategic Studies; ‘SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2017’, SIPRI.
It is worth pointing out that the category of  ‘military and security spending’ sometimes does 
appear within the publicly declared budgets of  GCC countries (e.g. Bahrain and Oman). 
However, and with the exception of  Kuwait, ‘military spending’ is usually presented as 
one broad, catch-all category, and it is unclear whether purchases of  military equipment 
imports enter into such figures, or whether they only focus on domestic expenditure, such 
as salaries and ministerial operations. Indeed military and security budgets are often the 
largest single-item expenditure in the budgets, which regularly take up a quarter of  the 
declared budgets or more. For example, 25 percent of  Bahrain’s 2013 budget was allocated 
to military and security expenditure,20 while in Saudi Arabia 25 percent of  the preliminary 
2016 budget went to the military and security sector.21 Hence, given the large outlays on the 
military, which rank as the highest in the world and which often take up the biggest outlays 
in the GCC budgets, and given the lack of  details on such outlays, there is significant 
opaqueness in the allocation of  these large sums within GCC budgetary expenditures.
20 ‘Statement of  the Bahrain Transparency Society on the State Budget for 2013–2014’ [Kalemat 
al jamiyya al Bahrainiyya lel shafafiyyah hawla mizaniyyat al Dawla lel amain 2013-2014], Bahrain 
Transparency Society, 9 June 2013. Available at http://alshafafeyabh.org/index/-ةينيرحبلا-ةيعمجلا-ةملك
م-لوح-ةيفافشلل/ (accessed 20 December 2016).
21 ‘Ministry of  Finance Statement on the occasion of  issuing of  the State Public Budget’ [Bayan 
wazarat al maliyya bemunasabat sudoor al mizaniyya al aama lel dawla], Al Arabiya. Available at http://
static.alarabiya.net/files/PDF/2015/12/28/860d0de6-150f-4b8b-8f7f-b4082cf844ac.pdf  (accessed 
20 December 2016).
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The third variable which could point to the fact that declared accounts might not match 
actual budget accounts is the private allocations of  oil revenues, particularly to royal 
courts and members of  the royal families. Such allocations are usually controlled and 
distributed by the royal court in each country, and most often take the form of  monthly 
allowances for royal family members based on their rank. The allocations could also 
include transfers for such items as land grants, wedding allowances, travel and so forth. 
As mentioned previously, royal allocations out of  public revenues are undisclosed in the 
GCC countries, with the exception of  Kuwait. Estimating such private allocations is in its 
very nature even more shrouded in secrecy (not to mention danger) than estimating mili-
tary deals, since there are international sources that report the values of  military deals, no 
matter how incomplete they are. The same could not be said regarding royal allocations. 
Of  course, one could always list as evidence anecdotes regarding alleged wealth estimates 
or extravagant deals involving multimillion-dollar mansions and yachts made by individ-
ual members of  the royal family, but these are best left to the rumour pages of  tabloids. 
Probably the most infamous of  these recent revelations have been WikiLeaks’ 2013 Amer-
ican Embassy cables, which showed estimates by US Embassy staff  of  the nature and size 
of  such royal allocations in Saudi Arabia in 1996: 
The most common mechanism for distributing the nation’s wealth to the royal family 
is the formal, budgeted system of  monthly stipends for all members of  the Al Saud, 
managed by the Ministry of  Finance’s ‘Office of  Decisions and Rules’. The stipends 
range from $270,000 per month on the high end to $800 per month for the lowliest 
member of  the most remote branch of  the family. Bonus payments are available for 
marriage and palace building. The Embassy estimates that the stipends system puts 
an annual drain of  about $2 billion on the $40 billion government budget.
Aside from the stipends system, a handful of  the senior-most princes enrich them-
selves by controlling several billion dollars in annual expenditures in ‘off-budget’ 
programs. With no ministry of  finance oversight or controls, these programs are 
widely viewed as sources of  royal rakeoffs. [ … ] Through these off-budget pro-
grams, five or six princes control the revenues from one million barrels per day 
(b/d) of  the Kingdom’s eight million b/d of  crude oil production.22
Hence, private royal allocations, military expenditure and foreign transfers provide three 
broad categories with significant opaqueness in the budgets of  the GCC. Although – as 
we have seen – information in recent years has been patchy in all three categories, the 
same could not be said regarding the not so distant past. There is a useful source of  infor-
mation on this area: the British colonial archives. Indeed, if  we dig through the available 
documents, they show that such appropriations have historically been quite large. 
In the following section, we present original primary research on what the British colonial 
archives reveal regarding the origins, nature and size of  GCC state budgets. The archives 
22  ‘Saudi Royal Wealth: Where do They Get all That Money?’, Wikileaks. Available at http://www.
wikileaks-forum.com/cablegate/7/wikileaks-cable-saudi-royal-wealth-where-do-they-get-all-that-
money/16898/ (accessed 6 September 2017).
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give significant details on budget expenditures in the Gulf, and also act as a useful contrast 
and counterbalance to the lack of  information in current budgets. Indeed, it has not always 
been the case that the final accounts of  GCC countries were not fully audited and disclosed. 
Quite the contrary: history shows that, in some countries at least, there were meticulously 
audited and transparent budgets. Indeed, it will be shown that the oil boom of  1973 was 
a turning point in budgetary transparency, as the large surpluses enabled governments to 
spend significantly on the public while at the same time allowing for them to appropriate 
public funds away from public accountability and security and towards private ends. 
The ‘Privy Purse’: Then and Now
Bahrain as the Founding Case
To understand the history of  state budgets in the GCC, we need to go back in history to 
the 1920s, with Bahrain as the first testing ground. The government of  the island began 
implementing a fully documented and independently audited budget and final accounts 
during this decade, a product of  the colonial state-building enterprise that was under-
taken by the British starting from 1923. By deposing the then ruler and instating his son, 
as well as installing a British ‘advisor’ who in effect became Bahrain’s first prime minis-
ter for more than 30 years until 1957, the British initiated a series of  so-called reforms 
to establish a modern state bureaucracy in the country. An essential part of  this was an 
audited budget along modern lines. The budget was prepared by Charles Belgrave, the 
infamous ‘advisor’, along with his team in the Finance Department. It was independently 
audited by Messrs. Whitney Murray & Co., Baghdad, chartered accountants.23
This of  course does not mean that these audits and budgets were readily provided for 
all the public to participate in and critique. Far from it: the state structure was author-
itarian and top-down in nature. However, for the limited parties that it was distributed 
to, the Bahrain Annual Report did include meticulous accounts, including any deviations 
in numbers and explanations for increases or decreases in revenues and expenditures. 
This was not done out of  benevolence. The British had staked their claim to increased 
meddling in local affairs on the basis of  their ability to introduce state reforms and so-called 
economic ‘development’. Having a well-oiled (pun intended) functioning bureaucracy was 
to their mind an important part of  the package.
The situation was different in the rest of  what would become the GCC. 
Indeed, before oil was discovered, the British had limited interest in intervening in the 
running of  local affairs outside of  Bahrain (and Oman to a lesser extent). Hence, the 
(meagre) finances of  the state at that point, which primarily came from customs on imports 
(and Hajj in Saudi Arabia), were in effect the finances of  the ruler, and it fell to him to 
23 ‘Government of  Bahrain Annual Report for the Year 1356 (March 1937–February 1938)’, Govern-
ment of  Bahrain. Available at www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100024140826.0x000084 (accessed 
14 February 2017).
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utilise and distribute as he saw fit what was in effect his own personal budget. As is well 
known, the advent of  oil revenues marked a watershed in the region as a whole, changing 
the politics and economics of  the region tremendously. We will limit our discussion here, 
however, to the effects of  oil revenues on the budgeting and auditing of  state finances. 
Given that it was the first place where oil was discovered in 1932, Bahrain was again the 
laboratory for the distribution of  oil revenues, which would set the precedent for the rest 
of  the Gulf  states. The agreement that was reached between the British colonial admin-
istrators, the oil companies and the local ruler was that one third of  oil revenues were to 
be directed towards the ‘privy purse’ of  the ruler as his personal share of  the oil revenue, 
which he could distribute as he saw fit. Another third would be used to finance the 
annual state budget expenditure, and the final third would be invested in a reserve fund. 
These different shares were officially recorded and presented in the annual budgets and 
their closing accounts at the end of  each year. Thus, in effect, the royal family was receiv-
ing annually the equivalent of  the rest of  the state’s annual expenditure for that year.
In the following part of  the paper, we will rely heavily on quoting British colonial officials 
to relay their viewpoints on the allocations of  state budgets and their expenditure during 
the periods in question. The reader should be forewarned, however, about the orientalist 
and colonialist gaze present in the discourse, which was a prevalent feature amongst colo-
nial officials in the Gulf, just as was the case in colonial administrations in other parts of 
the world. We have opted to present the quotations verbatim, however, in order to narrate 
the story, as well as shed light on the discourses and views of  the different British colonial 
administrators at that time period.
Thus, the advisor Charles Belgrave wrote regarding the ‘privy purse’ budgetary alloca-
tions in Bahrain in the year 1950:
This type of  expenditure is from our Western standpoint open to criticism [ … ] 
We need not grudge the ruler the increase in his privy purse, and he is perhaps 
wise to be generous to his relations as in the primitive and patriarchal conditions 
prevailing in the Gulf  Shaikhdoms, discontented members of  the ruling families 
are always the main potential source of  political trouble.24
Indeed, the British Political Resident in the Gulf, Sir Rupert Hay, at the time echoes a 
similar sentiment:
Although a Ruler may have little trouble with his people, his relations are often a 
thorn in his flesh. There may be a few who are of  real assistance to him, but the rest 
may be divided into two classes, those who want both money and power and those 
who want only money [ … ] The latter class is far more numerous. There are a multi-
tude of  shaikhs who refused to do any work and some of  them lead debauched lives. 
They clamour continuously for increased allowances and make a Ruler’s life a 
burden to him. He finds it difficult to resist their appeals.25  
24 British National Archives: FO 371/91299. 
25 Ali Khalifa Al-Kuwari, ‘Oil Revenue of  the Arabian Gulf  Emirates: Patterns of  Allocation and Impact on 
Economic Development,’ (doctoral dissertation, Durham University, 1974), p. 209.
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The practice that the British colonial administrators, the oil companies and the ruler 
developed regarding what the British called the ‘privy purse’ distribution in Bahrain set 
a precedent for the rest of  the Gulf  emirates under British colonial rule, particularly in 
terms of  personal allocations from the oil revenues for the rulers and their families.26 
Budgets in Qatar, Oman and the UAE
As oil started to be exported from Qatar in 1949, the British forced the ruler to ‘step down’ 
for his son to take over. Simultaneously, the British appointed a political agent to Qatar and 
sent an advisor to the ruler in 1950, to oversee developing a modern bureaucracy, organise 
budgetary allocations and put together a development plan for the country, using Bahrain 
as a model. This was noteworthy, since in prior decades the British did not even have a 
political agent in Qatar; oil revenues obviously changed these considerations significantly. 
Furthermore, this was the period which witnessed the flowering of  the discourse and focus 
on economic development, as the obsession with the material improvement of  ‘developing 
countries’ became a central concern of  Western countries and institutions.27
The British, however, found the going much tougher in Qatar, as they were never able to 
establish as complete a dominance in internal affairs as they did in Bahrain. Indeed, the 
squabbles over allocations of  the oil revenues were much more intense, and the British 
faced much more significant pushback from members of  the royal family in terms of  their 
personal allocations. In the year 1950/51, for example, which was the first year a proper 
budget was produced, out of  a budgeted expenditure of  70 lakhs, no less than 30 lakhs 
were allocated to the royal family.28 By 1959, allocations to the royal family had exceeded 
50 percent of  oil revenues, and the advisor, although able to set up the rudiments of  a 
government bureaucracy, ended up leaving, feeling largely defeated.29 Indeed the internal 
squabbles between the British and royal family members, coupled with increasing public 
resentment as well as the inability of  the oil revenues to cover the increasing rising expen-
diture, led to a settlement between the ruling family members and the British, upon which 
a new ruler took over in 1961, and it was agreed that royal allocations would not exceed 
50 percent of  oil revenues.
In Oman and the UAE, oil was not discovered until the mid-1960s. Thus, in Oman, as 
was the case in the rest of  the Gulf  countries before the arrival of  oil, import taxes con-
tinued to be the main source of  revenue, which were handled by a director of  general 
customs from the Indian subcontinent. Unlike the other Gulf  states, however, Oman did 
not have a large, dispersed and powerful royal family, with most of  the power instead 
being concentrated solely in the hands of  the sultan. 
26 Ali Khalifa Al-Kuwari, Lycium Barbarum: Biography and Memories [Al-Awsaj: Seerah wa Thekrayat] 
(Beirut: Difaf, 2015), pp. 37–8, 104.
27 For more see A. Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of  the Third World (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 2011).
28 British National Archives: FO 371/91297.
29 Al-Kuwari, Lycium Barbarum [Al-Awsaj], p. 117.
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In the midst of  the aforementioned infatuation with development that overtook the 
Western institutions after World War II, the British sent an economic expert to review 
the state of  the Omani economy in 1951. Regarding the budget, he commented that 
this was ‘a state where the administration is still rudimentary, and where the practice 
of  the last three years has been to keep the Sultan’s revenues a closely guarded secret’. 
There were no receipts or breakdown of  the source of  revenues, which lagged far behind 
those of  other areas in the Gulf  in terms of  size, as Muscat’s economic powers had dimin-
ished considerably by then. 
The report made clear how financial decisions were made:
The standstill policy from which the whole administration is suffering is dictated 
by the Sultan. He is conservative by temperament and haunted by the memory of 
bankruptcy in his father’s days. He refuses to delegate authority, and prolonged ab-
sences at Salalah remove him from the administrative scene. American missionaries, 
who have known him from his boyhood allege that he wishes his people to remain 
backward, convinced that education brought about the end of  British rule in India. 
Progress, anyhow, is alien to the tradition of  the interior and the Sultan may ar-
gue that there is no chance of  regaining his hold over the followers of  the Imam 
if  he indulges in modern experiment.30 
On the Dhofar region, the report added that ‘this province is treated by the Sultan as 
a private estate and its revenue and expenditure are to the best of  my belief  dealt with 
entirely separately from the State’s ordinary finances.’
Indeed, this was one of  the main reasons that by the mid-1960s, Dhofar was ground zero 
for a revolution that shook the fundamentals of  rule in the Sultanate and indeed the whole 
Gulf. By 1970, the British colonial administrators in Oman decided to stage a coup that 
overthrew the previous ruler and installed in his place his son, Qaboos, who continues 
to rule until this day.31 Concerned at the rising success of  the insurgency, the British felt 
that the ruler’s conservatism and lack of  an economic development plan were a major 
hindrance, and that they needed to embark on a strategy that involved a modernisation 
of  governmental bureaucracy and services, a familiar theme, as we have seen and will 
continue to see. 
This did not mean that budgetary woes were over under the new sultan. In 1971, 20 
percent of  the budget was spent on palaces, not counting the new ruler’s travel and other 
luxury items. In turn, 40 percent of  state revenue went on military expenditure, primar-
ily against the Dhofari revolution.32 This rose further in 1972, as out of  a budget of  50 
million Omani rials, military expenditure took 30 million. Indeed, between the personal 
spending of  the sultan and the military requirements to counter the revolution, matters 
30 British National Archives: FO 371/91297. Letter from British Residency, 28 March 1951, ‘The 
economy of  Muscat in 1951’.
31 Abdel Razzaq Takriti, Monsoon Revolution: Republicans, Sultans, and Empires in Oman, 1965–1976 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 187.
32 Ibid., p. 218.
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had reached such a critical point in that year that the country’s finances were only bailed 
out by two sizeable grants from Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi, as foreign transfers from 
and between Gulf  countries became a regular occurrence.33 
In Dubai too, oil was not discovered until 1966. However, the situation of  the economy 
was very different from that witnessed in Muscat. To illustrate, we return to the comments 
of  the British colonial officials, once again asking to be excused for the orientalist dis-
course of  the colonial gaze present in them:
The Arabian Nights atmosphere which prevails there is remarkable. Without any 
regular police the bazaar is clean and well-kept and there is almost complete 
security [ … ] The entire economy of  Dubai depends on the volume of  her im-
ports, and it is essential to discover the causes which account for the remarkable 
prosperity of  the moment [ … ] The character of  Dubai is, by modern standards, 
approaching that of  a free port [ … ] The Sheikhdom is administered on purely 
oriental lines and authentic figures are not available [… ] The son of  the ruler 
draws whatever amounts are needed from the customs director by means of  in-
formal requests inscribed on scraps of  paper.
Across the Gulf, the lack of  meticulously documented fiscal accounts was a common 
feature before the advent of  modern bureaucracies, and the running of  fiscal affairs 
during those times followed similar lines:
In the course of  the conversation the Shaikh affected not to know the amount of 
his revenue [ … ] This oriental attitude of  the ruler towards his finances is incom-
prehensible until one visits Dubai and sees how the system works. The Shaikh and 
his son probably know approximately what the revenues are but do not desire to 
be informed in detail: it is the job of  the Customs officer to pay the Shaikh what-
ever sum is needed and this function is being fulfilled. Western methods would 
entail some clear separation of  the public budget from the privy purse, and with 
the examples of  Bahrain and Qatar before him the Shaikh of  Dubai would not 
un-naturally prefer the status quo.34
The situation in Abu Dhabi was markedly different from that in Dubai, and indeed was 
closer to the situation in Oman. Oil was not discovered until 1966, which also proved a 
tumultuous year for another reason. The British were once again under the impression 
that urgent economic development was needed, and they believed that they faced with 
the ruler Sheikh Shakhbut a similar situation to the one they faced in Oman. They per-
ceived him as being archaic, erratic and too tight with money, and thus not spending the 
money necessary on internal development. Oil revenues went to the ruler personally, and 
he distributed them as he saw fit: ‘He regards himself  as absolute master within his own 
domains, responsible to none and answerable to none. On internal affairs he is the only 
arbiter and will accept advice from none.’35 Finally, internal anger within the ruling family, 
33 Ibid., ch. 10.
34 British National Archives: FO 371/91297. Letter from British Residency, 28 June 1951.
35 British National Archives: FO 1016/737.
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coupled with British dissatisfaction with his rule, led to the ruler’s deposition and his exile 
to Khorramshahr in Iran in early August 1966. He was replaced by his brother, the young 
and charismatic Sheikh Zayed, who led the economic boom of  the emirate and the UAE 
over the next quarter of  a century.
Thus, between 1923 and 1970, the British forcibly deposed four rulers (Bahrain in 1923, 
Sharjah in 1965, Abu Dhabi in 1966 and Oman in 1970) and arranged for the forced 
‘resignation’ of  two more (Qatar in 1949 and 1960). Three of  the palace coups occurred 
in the southern Gulf  (the UAE and Oman) within five years. In all cases, the reason from 
a British point of  view was the irrationality and instability of  the mode of  rule under 
the ancien régime in an era that they believed should be geared towards development and 
modernisation. Thus, internal rule had to be reorganised, and budgetary reforms were a 
central plank of  this drive. 
Once oil revenues started flowing in all the cases discussed above, a significant proportion 
would be directed towards social services, and it would be inaccurate to ignore the increases 
in health, education, infrastructural, housing and other services that these revenues facili-
tated in the Gulf  countries over the latter half  of  the twentieth century. However, given the 
focus of  this paper, it would also be inaccurate to deny that significant proportions of  the 
oil revenues went towards private allocations for the ruler and the royal family. Thus, in the 
case of  Bahrain, 32.3 percent of  total oil revenues went to the ruling family in 1947/48 
and 1970, in Abu Dhabi 25.0 percent between 1967 and 1970, and in Qatar 35.1 percent 
between 1953 and 1970, complemented by a further 6.6 percent for land purchases, which 
in large part went to high-ranking individuals from the royal family who were the primary 
beneficiaries of  the enclosures of  large plots of  previously unowned land.36 
The History of Budgets in Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia was a different story from the rest of  the GCC countries, as it was unique in 
the Gulf, and indeed the Arab world, in that the ruling regime and its heartland central 
province of  Najd were never subjected to direct colonialism by the British or any other 
Western imperial force.37 As with the rest of  the Gulf  countries, however, the export of  oil 
in commercial quantities after World War II had a remarkable impact on public revenues. 
For the first few years, there was barely an administrative bureaucracy, and the distribu-
tion of  funds was largely at the discretion of  the ruler, as was witnessed in other places 
before British interference. The year 1957 proved to be fateful, however, and this time 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD, which would later become the World Bank) played the role of 
advising on development that the British advisors played elsewhere in the Gulf. 
36 Al-Kuwari, Oil Revenue, p. 186.
37 The treaty of  Darin was signed with the British in 1915, but was as much a defensive arrangement 
by the British to limit the expansion of  Ibn Saud as it was supposed to be a protection treaty.
20 Show Us the Money
Once again, we leave it to the British Embassy in Saudi Arabia to narrate the events in 
1958:38
Despite the apparent progress during the past years, Saudi Arabia is now beset by 
an economic and exchange crisis. The factors behind the present difficulties are 
not far to seek. The expenditure incurred during recent years by the Saudi Gov-
ernment and, in particular, by the Ruling Family, was geared to maximum oil pro-
duction and often exceeded the revenue from oil. The economy was therefore ill 
equipped to meet the recession which followed the Suez crisis when, as a gesture 
to Arab solidarity, King Saud cut the supply of  oil to Bahrain, which represented 
one-fifth of  the total Aramco production; the sales of  oil to other markets were 
also curtailed by the shortage of  tankers during the ‘post Suez’ period. Official 
reserves of  exchange were further depleted by the flight of  the Saudi silver rial 
which then provided the main backing of  the paper issue.  
In early 1957, the situation had become so grave that import restrictions were introduced. 
The value of  the rial decreased from 100 rials = 125 rupees to 100 rials = 82 rupees. 
The result of  the depreciation of  the currency was a shortage of  luxury goods, and later, 
of  essentials such as food. The cost of  living rose significantly, reaching 35 to 40 percent 
above the level of  October 1956.
The British Embassy report continues: 
Scandals regarding the administration of  funds and the allocation of  exchange 
by officials of  the Saudi Monetary Agency also reached the ears of  King Saud 
[ … ] [He] was persuaded to invite Dr. Ahmed Zaki Saʿad of  the I.B.R.D. and the 
International Monetary Fund, as a consultant [ … ] Saʿad had a long interview 
with the King, during which he pointed out, in no uncertain terms, the danger 
of  continuing the present rate of  unrestrained and extravagant expenditure by 
both the Government and the Ruling Family. It is said, from a reliable source, that 
Saʿad told King Saud that if  he wished to emulate King Farouk, he could not do 
better than continue his present policy.
During his review of  Saudi finances, Saʿad informed King Saud that the Govern-
ment debt was in excess of  U.S. $ 700 million (a sum which is equivalent to two 
years’ revenue) [ … ] Saʿad stressed that the was in danger and that retrenchment 
was now a matter of  great urgency.
The reforms that were introduced sowed the seeds for the modern monetary system of 
the Gulf  that was eventually adopted by other GCC countries as well: a fully covered 
currency with a fixed exchange rate, with some attempts at balanced budgets and man-
agement of  oil expenditures and revenues. From that year onwards and until the oil boom 
of  the 1970s, Saudi Arabia put together published budgets which – at least when com-
pared to those publicly published in 2015 – were relatively detailed, and which provide a 
glimpse into the different allocations of  public finances. Regarding the budget for the year 
1960/61, for example, which was a relative austerity budget after the previously men-
38 British National Archives: FO 371/133156.
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tioned financial crises, the British Embassy said the following:39 ‘The 55 million dollars 
allocated to “King and Royal Family” represents 14.4 percent of  total expenditure – more 
than that devoted to projects described as “economic development”, but less than that 
devoted to religious purposes.’ This, it should be remembered, was a budget in which the 
then prime minister Prince Faisal severely cut royal allowances, by up to one half  accord-
ing to British estimates. Indeed, the future king built a reputation as being a generally 
austere person who significantly curtailed, although as we have seen not completely elim-
inated, the substantial personal allocations to members of  the royal family. 
This continued for the next decade for which data was still available. For example, in the 
budget of  1971/72, by which time Faisal was king, out of  a total budget of  10.782 billion 
Saudi rials only 173.1 million Saudi rials (1.6 percent) was allocated to the private treasury. 
However, the Ministry of  Defence and its branches was allocated 2.347 billion Saudi rials 
(23.5 percent), more than three times the allocation for education and ten times that for 
health. In the previous year’s budget of  6.380 billion Saudi rials, defence actually took up 
28.5 percent, and the private allocation, which was unchanged in nominal terms, took up 
2.7 percent. In both of  these years, approximately 10 percent of  revenues were allocated 
to payments to Egypt and Jordan in the wake of  the Khartoum agreement after the 1967 
defeat against Israel.40 Thus, the three categories of  royal allocations, defence budgets and 
foreign transfers took up more than 40 percent of  the budget for that year.
The Unique Case of Kuwait
As previously mentioned, Kuwait embarked on a unique path, different from those of 
the other countries in terms of  its budgetary transparency and independence. This does 
not mean that these countries did not all face similar conditions. Indeed, the British also 
tried to install advisors and control the budgetary and development process in Kuwait. 
Hence, a colonial ex-military figure, Major General William Hasted, was brought in to 
oversee the ‘Development Department’, while G. C. L. Crichton was brought in as a 
financial controller at the beginning of  the 1950s as oil revenues boomed tremendously. 
However, as the political agent would admit, the British were never able to establish full 
control, as the then-emir Sheikh Abdullah Al-Salim refused to appoint an overarching 
British advisor, and instead resorted to giving senior posts to other members of  the ruling 
family, local notables and Arab advisors, such as Izzat Jaafar and Majd-Udeen Jabri, the 
ex-Syrian minister, in manoeuvres designed to ensure a relative balance of  power and 
independence from the British. Hence, the British colonial officials faced a much more 
contested field, and they quickly resigned themselves to being on the margin. 
Kuwait was the first country after Saudi Arabia to gain independence, in 1961. As was 
intimated previously, Kuwait developed the strongest laws in terms of  budgetary indepen-
dence and transparency. Hence, the audit bureau was placed under the parliament in the 
constitution of  1962, and the audited accounts were made public.41 
39 British National Archives: FO 371/157011.
40 British National Archives: FCO 8/1743 Saudi Budget. Letter from the Embassy.
41 The periods 1976–80 and 1986–90 were exceptions when parliament was suspended.
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In terms of  royal allocations of  budgets, these were fixed at certain amounts instead of 
percentages, and indeed the allocated sums fluctuated over time. Hence, in 1963/64, the 
amount allocated to the emir was 10 million Kuwaiti dinars, which was then decreased to 8 
million in 1970/71. As a percentage of  total oil revenues, this decreased from 5.2 percent to 
2.6 percent.42 As a comparison, the percentage stood at 11 percent in 1950.43 Over time, 
the absolute numbers were subsequently increased, reaching 50 million Kuwaiti dinars in 
2006 as we have seen, but they continued to constitute a smaller percentage of  the overall 
budget compared to other Gulf  countries.
However, there were other, indirect manners in which oil revenues were distributed to 
influential private individuals in Kuwait. Chief  amongst these were land purchases by 
the government; although these benefitted individual citizens as well, the vast majority 
went towards influential individuals, composed mainly of  senior royal family members 
and merchants. Thus, while royal allocations in Kuwait from 1952 to 1970 made up 2.7 
percent of  oil revenues, land purchases gobbled up 20.6 percent of  the same revenues.44
The 1970s Oil Boom and Subsequent Budgetary Opacity
Bahrain had a chance to follow the Kuwaiti model of  a partially elected parliament when 
it gained independence with the remainder of  the GCC countries in 1971. Significant 
local opposition and sickness forced Belgrave, the advisor, to depart in 1957, after which 
there was a lull and confusion in the governmental bureaucracy, given that it was modelled 
on him being the overlord who oversaw the whole administration. This lull was reflected 
in a deterioration in the public accounts of  the budget. Thus, after 1959, the budgets no 
longer showed all revenue received by the state or its allocations, and only showed two 
thirds of  the revenue, leaving out the third allocated to the ruler. 
By the mid-1960s, the brother of  the new emir had risen to establish himself  as the new 
chief  executive, a role he continued to play as the prime minister after independence, 
a position he still holds today. However, the budget continued to be opaque and to lack 
transparency. Thus, when the Abu Safah field was discovered in 1966 and its revenues 
were jointly shared with Saudi Arabia, eventually becoming the largest source of  oil 
revenues for Bahrain, its accounts did not appear in the budgets of  the government. 
Instead, the revenues were directly allocated to the privy purse of  the ruler, in addition to 
the third of  the previous oil revenues from the onshore fields.45 The British Gulf  Resident 
had the following to say on the 1966 budget:46
As is usually the case with official documents prepared by the Bahrain Govern-
ment, one is left with a feeling of  anti-climax on reading through the Budget. 
For something preluded, as this was, by so much inter-departmental lobbying, so 
42 Al-Kuwari, Oil Revenue, p. 210.
43 British National Archives: FO 371/91297.
44 Al-Kuwari, Oil Revenue, p. 186.
45 Ibid., p. 111.
46 British National Archives: FO 371/185338.
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many personal intrigues and such frequent agonies of  doubt, it is notable only for 
its similarity with previous Budgets: i.e. its layout is the same, its lack of  detail is 
the same, its inaccuracy is the same and, with few exceptions, its expectations and 
distribution of  revenue are the same. Indeed, what is presented and the manner 
of  its presentation, serves as a striking example of  the administrative malaise that 
is at the heart of  so many of  Bahrain’s problems. It is perhaps as well for the Bah-
rain Government’s reputation that the budget is never published.
By the time of  independence, and after significant local pressure and opposition, there 
was a push by the British to nudge the local rulers towards establishing some semblance of 
parliamentary constitutional rule. A constitution was adopted in 1973, largely modelled 
on Kuwait’s 1962 constitution, which similarly placed the public audit bureau under the 
majority-elected parliament. The parliament entered into a heated confrontation with the 
government in 1973 regarding the emir’s allocations from oil revenues, with several secret 
sessions of  the assembly held on the matter. An agreement was not reached until the last 
working session of  the assembly, upon which the emir’s allocation was set at 6 million 
Bahraini dinars, a significant reduction percentage-wise in the ruler’s income to less than 
10 percent of  oil revenues.47 
This situation did not last long, however. Arguments between the parliament and the gov-
ernment over the renewal of  the military base contract with the American navy, as well 
as over the controversial new security law, coupled with the rising oil revenues from the 
1973 oil boom, gave the government the confidence to dissolve the parliament, suspend 
the constitution, declare a state of  emergency, and end the experiment with democracy in 
Bahrain for the next twenty-five years. With it also ended the practice of  independently 
audited and publicly published government accounts, and consequently any information 
on private allocations.
Indeed, although unprecedented amounts of  revenue poured into the Gulf  states with 
the oil boom of  the 1970s, that period also signalled the end of  publicly available and 
independently audited governmental accounts of  revenues and expenditures in all of  the 
countries, with the exception of  Kuwait. Never again would there be full disclosure and 
auditing of  all oil revenues and their expenditures. 
As oil incomes and states’ budgetary needs grew tremendously over the subsequent 
decades, other channels appeared that allowed for appropriations and enrichment. 
Particularly, the power of  having high-ranking positions in government, or using royal 
privileges in land dealing and other business activities, grew markedly with the growth 
in the budgets and economy.48 Hence, direct appropriations from the privy purse have 
been complemented by senior figures appropriating institutional ‘fiefdoms’ (ministries, 
foundations), whose publicly funded budgets allowed for the build-up of  riches and influence 
47 Al-Kuwari, Oil Revenue, p. 210.
48 For a more detailed study on Bahrain, see Omar Hesham AlShehabi and Saleh Suroor, ‘Unpacking 
“Accumulation By Dispossession”, “Fictitious Commodification”, and “Fictitious Capital Formation”: 
Tracing the Dynamics of  Bahrain’s Land Reclamation’, Antipode 48/4 (2016), pp. 835–56.
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for those who controlled such ministries. Indeed, it is very possible that the share of  direct 
royal allowances in budgets has declined, even if  they have grown in absolute terms, 
across the decades, while the use of  these other channels for enrichment has increased. 
The lack of  detailed data in this respect, however, makes any hard conclusions nearly 
impossible to reach. 
So How Much?
The secrecies and vagueness regarding the allocations of  public oil revenues continue 
until today. The question remains, however: is there a way to gain at least an approximate 
measure of  the gap between published and actual numbers? Thus, can one show numer-
ically that there is indeed a gap, regardless of  the exact size of  it?
Although this is by nature a difficult task that is shrouded in inaccuracies, there have 
been previous attempts to show that there is a gap and indeed to quantify it, while also 
being mindful that given the nature of  the problem, any estimates would obviously be 
nearly impossible to verify. Probably the most serious attempt has been made by Qatari 
researcher Dr Ali Al-Kuwari, as he attempted to quantify declared vs. actual oil revenues 
that accumulated from the oil boom in the first decade of  the twenty-first century for 
a selected sample of  years.49 The method was simple yet revealing: all GCC countries 
provide official overall figures for central government revenues, whether they are provided 
directly through their respective ministries of  finance, or through official IMF Article IV 
reports. In contrast, the Institute of  International Finance (IIF), which describes itself  as 
‘the global association of  the financial industry’, provides one of  the most trusted figures 
on the revenues from oil exports in the GCC countries, relying on its knowledge of  the 
financial channels and networks globally through which such oil revenues would have to 
flow in one form or another. 
Now the two variables – revenues from oil exports vs. central government oil revenues 
– obviously do not match directly. Indeed, central government revenues from oil should 
theoretically exceed those of  oil exports, since they include local revenues from selling oil 
as well. The latter, however, should be quite small, since the price of  oil was significantly 
subsidised locally until the beginning of  2016.50 Hence, Al-Kuwari compared the two 
figures – that based on officially published numbers for central government revenues vs. 
IIF estimates – for oil exports from each country for five years, from 2002 to 2006.
In what follows,51 we repeated the simple exercise of  comparing IIF data for oil export 
49 Ali Khalifa Al-Kuwari, The Third Oil boom and the Repercussions of  the Global Financial Crisis [Al-Tafra 
Al-Neftiyya Al-Thaletha wa en’ekasat al-Maleyya al-Alameyya] (Beirut: Centre for Arab Unity Studies, 
2009).
50 Comprehensive calculations would also have to subtract oil costs of  production in each country – 
which although low are not insignificant – from their export revenues for a more complete comparison.
51 For more details see the original calculations in AlShehabi, AlKhaleej Bayna AlThabet wal Mutahawwel 
[The Gulf  between Stability and Change].
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revenues with publicly declared central government revenues from oil, but we expanded 
the data set to ten years, to include 2002 to 2011. Once again, we must stress that caution 
should be applied to the figures, as they are not supposed to reflect the gap accurately, but 
show that there is a gap that necessitates explaining. 
What we notice is that in the case of  Kuwait, which provides comprehensive audited final 
accounts audited by an independent audit bureau under the jurisdiction of  the elected 
national assembly, we find that the publicly declared central government revenues mod-
estly exceed the value of  oil export revenues. This makes sense, since the difference could 
be attributed to revenues raised by the state from selling (heavily subsidised) oil locally.
In contrast, in the rest of  the GCC, instead of  declared oil revenues exceeding the value 
of  oil exports, we find that the value of  oil exports is significantly higher (Tables 1 and 2). 
Table 1. Total Value of Oil and Gas Exports According to the IIF, 2002–2011 
(USD Billion)
Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total
UAE 23.2 29.6 38.4 55.1 70.1 84.4 102.9 68.2 85.8 130.7 688.4
Bahrain 3.9 4.7 5.6 7.8 9.0 10.8 13.8 8.9 11.5 16.3 92.3
Saudi Arabia 63.7 82.1 110.9 161.8 188.5 206.4 281.0 163.3 215.2 324.5 1797.4
Oman 8.6 9.3 10.8 15.7 17.5 18.7 28.7 18.1 25.2 34.6 187.2
Qatar 9.9 12.1 16.3 22.9 31.2 40.7 63.3 43.8 65.9 108.3 414.4
Kuwait 14.1 19.6 27.8 44.1 53.2 59.0 82.6 48.9 61.8 94.9 506.0
Total 123.4 157.4 209.8 307.4 369.5 420.0 572.3 351.2 465.4 709.3 3685.7
Table 2. Total Officially Declared Public Oil and Gas Revenues, 2002–2011 
(USD Billion)
Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total
UAE 15.0 20.5 27.0 41.9 59.0 63.2 98.2 47.4 63.8 98.8 534.7
Bahrain 1.8 2.2 2.5 3.3 3.7 4.3 6.0 3.7 4.9 6.5 39.0
Saudi Arabia 44.3 61.6 88.0 134.5 161.2 149.9 262.2 115.8 178.7 275.8 1472.2
Oman 6.0 6.3 8.3 9.4 10.1 11.8 15.8 13.7 16.8 28.5 126.8
Qatar 5.0 5.4 10.0 12.7 15.2 19.4 22.0 22.7 26.6 42.1 181.2
Kuwait 19.0 21.0 28.2 44.7 50.0 61.1 68.0 57.2 68.8 95.2 513.1
Total 91.1 117.0 163.9 246.5 299.3 309.8 472.2 260.7 359.6 546.9 2867.0
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The Mystery of Abu Safah in Bahrain
The case of  Bahrain requires a further note. This is because the vast majority of  Bah-
rain’s oil revenues come from the Abu Safah field, which is shared with Saudi Arabia. 
The official accounts of  Bahrain state that the revenue of  150,000 barrels per day accrues 
to Bahrain from the field, while Saudi Arabia for its part is supposed to receive the same 
amount. However, the case of  the exact deal that is implemented in practice with regard 
to Abu Safah is unknown, and it has been the case historically that revenues from this 
field were not included in the official public budget. Furthermore, Bahrain derives signifi-
cant revenue from refining oil imported from Saudi Arabia and then re-exporting it, thus 
making the calculations of  revenues in the case of  Bahrain significantly more opaque. 
Given the aforementioned reasons, we have excluded the values for Bahrain from the 
following calculations of  totals across the Gulf  countries (Tables 3 and 4). We have also 
excluded Kuwait, since as we have previously seen, central government oil revenues 
exceed the value of  oil exports. If  we focus instead on the other four countries, we find 
that the difference between the value of  oil and gas exports and the value of  publicly 
declared central government oil and gas revenues exceeds $772 billion in the period from 
2002 to 2011; this constitutes more than a quarter of  the total value of  oil and gas exports. 
Table 3. Percentage Difference Between Value of Oil Exports and Declared 
Public Oil Revenues, 2002–2011
Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total
UAE 35% 31% 2% 24% 16% 25% 5% 30% 26% 24% 22%
Saudi Arabia 30% 25% 21% 17% 14% 27% 7% 29% 17% 15% 18%
Oman 30% 32% 23% 40% 42% 37% 45% 24% 33% 17% 32%
Qatar 50% 55% 39% 44% 51% 52% 65% 48% 60% 61% 56%
Kuwait -35% -7% -1% -1% 6% -4% 18% -17% -11% 0% -1%
Total (excluding 
Bahrain and Kuwait) 33% 30% 24% 22% 20% 30% 16% 32% 27% 26% 26%
Table 4. Total Difference Between Value of Oil Exports and Declared Public Oil 
Revenues, 2002–2011 (USD Billion)
Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total
UAE 8.2 9.1 11.4 13.2 11.1 21.2 4.7 20.8 22.0 31.9 153.7
Saudi Arabia 19.4 20.5 22.9 27.3 27.3 56.5 18.8 47.5 36.5 48.7 325.2
Oman 2.6 3.0 2.5 6.3 7.4 6.9 12.9 4.3 8.4 6.0 60.4
Qatar 4.9 6.7 6.3 10.2 16.0 21.3 41.3 21.1 39.3 66.2 233.2
Kuwait -4.9 -1.4 -0.4 -0.6 3.2 -2.1 14.6 -8.3 -7.0 -0.3 -7.1
Total (excluding 
Bahrain and Kuwait) 35.1 39.3 43.2 57.0 61.8 105.8 77.7 93.6 106.2 152.8 772.5
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Once again, our aim here is not to provide precise figures for the size of  the gap, and these 
figures should be taken with a mountain of  salt. Our aim, rather, is to show that there is 
a huge lack of  transparency regarding public oil revenues, and that there is a significant 
gap between officially declared numbers for public oil revenues and the values for oil 
exports – whatever this gap happens to be – and that this gap requires pause for thought 
and explanation.
Although these figures seem vast, and indeed they are vast percentage-wise (26 percent), 
they are not too far off, and indeed are actually lower than, the amount the royal families 
have historically taken as private allocations. As we have seen, this reached more than 
50 percent in some countries at certain periods. When this is coupled with the fact that 
there are significant bodies with unpublished budgets, including the royal courts and the 
military, in conjunction with the structural lack of  transparency in the auditing process, 
then such large figures might not seem so fantastical.
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Conclusion
It is worth at this point restating the main conclusions of  this paper: 
1.  As of  2017, only Kuwait has a transparent, accountable and independently audited 
budget, oil revenues included. The rest of  the GCC countries do not have an inde-
pendently and publicly accountable audited budget, with the spectrum ranging 
from no kind of  public auditing at all to some form of  public, but not independently 
audited, budgets. 
2.  This was not historically the case, as there were cases of  independently audited 
budgets with significantly more transparency in the not too distant past prior to the 
1970s oil boom. The large surpluses generated during the boom allowed govern-
ments to increase public expenditure while also decreasing budgetary accountability, 
independence and transparency. Hence, there has been a significant decrease in all 
three factors since the 1970s oil boom. 
3.  With the exception of  Kuwait, there is strong evidence to suggest that there are 
significant amounts of  undeclared budget revenues, which go either into private 
hands or into secretive government transactions. These are mainly concentrated in 
foreign transfers, military expenditure and private royal allocations.
The year 2016 gave rise to intense discussions regarding the sustainability of  GCC state 
budgets in the wake of  falling oil prices, and there were strong statements by the govern-
ments themselves regarding the need for drastic reform if  these budgets were to remain 
viable. This paper aims to add to the debate by emphasising that the most obvious area 
to start reform should be in the transparency, accountability and independence of  these 
state budgets themselves. Indirect allusions to such questions have started surfacing 
within society and even among concerned public officials. For example, there has been 
much official fanfare regarding the proposed privatisation of  Aramco in Saudi Arabia’s 
Vision 2030, with one of  the main benefits of  privatisation being touted as the possible 
increased transparency in the company’s financial figures.52 Such justification seems to be 
a red herring, however, and is akin to arguing that if  one is concerned with increasing the 
market demand for steel, then one should advocate for the legalisation of  firearm sales. 
If  transparency is indeed the main target, it seems that it would make much more sense 
and be much easier to target transparency directly, by creating, for example, an indepen-
dent and accountable auditing body that oversees the oil company’s and government’s 
accounts, as is the case in Kuwait, Norway and many other countries around the world. 
Indeed, it seems that oversight of  state budgets, including their expenditures and reve-
nues, is the area that is in dire need of  transparency, independence and accountability, 
rather than focusing the blame solely on the oil companies, which are usually the most 
52 Haytham Tabesh, ‘Aramco’s IPO a Test of  Saudi Transparency’, MENASource, 22 January 2016. 
Available at www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/aramco-s-ipo-a-test-of-saudi-transparency 
(accessed 20 December 2016).
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efficiently run companies in the GCC countries.53 Official talk regarding such oversight of 
states’ budgets, however, has yet to be heard within the GCC.
What are the total oil revenues in each state? How is each and every dollar of  these reve-
nues allocated? And how can we ensure that an independent, trustworthy and accountable 
institution audits them and provides the numbers transparently to the public? These are 
the questions surrounding the GCC’s budgets that have become urgent. If  citizens are to 
be forced to undergo a period of  austerity and a reduction of  subsidies on water, electric-
ity and petrol, and indeed even the introduction of  taxes, then it seems only fair that they 
should have the opportunity to see transparently how much money there is, and how this 
money is spent. This would be an important first step down the path of  citizens eventually 
leading the process of  controlling these oil revenues and how they are spent, and indeed 
all other facets and institutions of  public and civic life in the GCC states.
53 Steffen Hertog, ‘The One Thing in Saudi Arabia that Works Well Is Under Threat’, Reuters, 3 
February 2016. Available at http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2016/02/03/the-one-thing-in-
saudi-arabia-that-works-well-is-under-threat (accessed 20 December 2016).
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